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CONFLICT TERMINATION & MILITARY STRATEGY

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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CONFLICT TERMINATION & MILITARY STRATEGY

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Terminating armed conflict on favorable terms has proven to be one of the most difficult tasks facing a nation's political and military leadership. Fred Ikle, in Every War Must End, stated: "Many wars in this century have been started with only the most nebulous expectations regarding the outcome, on the strength of plans that paid little, if any, attention to the ending."¹ B. H. Liddell Hart, in his 1954 classic Strategy, said of the Western creation and use of nuclear weapons to end World War II:

. . . the anxious state of the peoples of the free world today is a manifestation that the directing minds failed to think through the problem--of attaining peace through such a victory. They did not look beyond the immediate strategic aim of "winning the war," and were content to assume that military victory would assure peace--an assumption contrary to the general experience of history.²

In the forty years since this statement was made, I suggest the historical trend continues. Liddel Hart goes on to say: "The object in war is to attain a better peace--even if only from your point of view. Hence it is essential to conduct war with constant regard to the peace you desire."³ While the above statements are seemingly straightforward admonitions, there are ample grounds to make the case that these edicts have been neglected within this country. In both Cold War conflicts, Korea and Vietnam, one is unlikely to find a large number of military and civil leaders who

would make the case that these hostilities ended in an outcome that saw a "better peace." Even in our more recent conflict in the Persian Gulf, there are voices claiming that we fell short in attaining the objectives for which we went to war with Iraq.

Purpose. The purpose of this paper is to examine military strategy and its relationship to conflict termination. Within these pages, I hope to address the following two questions; first, what is the role of military strategy in affecting conflict termination, and secondly, what mechanisms are available to translate military strategy into favorable post-conflict conditions? In the post-Cold War era, with conflict scenarios moving away from global war in an uncertain "New World Order," this topic will require greater examination in the future.

To accomplish this task, the paper is divided into five parts. Chapter II provides a discussion on conflict termination theory literature and cultural influences that may affect how we view military strategy as a means to terminate conflicts within our society. Chapter III presents a historical analysis of the Korean, Vietnam and Persian Gulf wars in light of our strategy for ending the conflicts. Chapter IV discusses current U.S. military doctrine and the use of the operational level of war for strategists and military campaign planners. And finally, Chapter V provides concluding remarks and recommendations.

Definitions. Unlike most other fields of study, there is little agreement on terminology and definitions within the literature on conflict termination. For the purpose of this paper, conflict is characterized by the threat of or use of military force and other instruments of national power to achieve specific national objectives. This definition of conflict encompasses a wide spectrum of military actions ranging from nuclear and conventional war through lower intensity armed hostilities sponsored by a state. Within this use of the term conflict, war is a subset of conflict. The term conflict termination on favorable terms also requires a working definition. Conflict termination implies the cessation of hostilities and nothing more. Conflict termination on favorable terms occurs when one of the belligerents has achieved its political aims and possesses the ability (usually military leverage) to impose his will upon his adversary. One can conclude that conflict termination is a necessary condition for peace, but not a sufficient condition for a lasting peace.⁴ Therefore, conflict termination will be used within the context of bringing hostilities to an end accompanied by additional post-conflict activities, if needed, to achieve a specific end.

The term strategy is used loosely by many. Even the term military strategy has numerous definitions by those within the military. For this discussion, I will use the definitions provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Our national military strategy is defined as "the art and science of distributing and applying military power to attain national objectives in peace and war."⁵

This military component also includes the actual or threatened use of force. However, it is important to differentiate national military strategy from national security strategy, or grand strategy. National security strategy is defined as "the art and science of developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, military, and informational) to achieve objectives that contribute to national security."⁶

The nation's military strategy is only one instrument of our country's overall security strategy that attempts to achieve national interests. This process begins at the national level through the identification of interests. The national security strategy identifies the appropriate national instruments, or a combination of the instruments, and applies them to achieve a desired outcome. Military strategy must support our national strategy and comply with national policy, which is a broad course of action and/or guidance. Strategy consists of the ends, ways and means through which we can achieve our country's objectives.

CHAPTER II

CONFLICT TERMINATION THEORIES & MILITARY STRATEGY

There are numerous conflict termination studies that have been conducted in an attempt to predict conditions that will lead to peace. However, the vast majority of the literature discusses the complexities of conflict termination within a broad framework. Much of this material categorizes the social, economic, and political causal and termination factors surrounding the conflict within a historical perspective. Comparatively little material has been written on the more narrowly defined integration of military and political strategies to terminate conflict on favorable terms for the victor.

Conflict Termination Theories. The study of conflict termination attempts to examine both the conceptual and practical difficulties of ceasing hostilities between belligerents. Most conflict termination studies are generally forced to assume that rational actors are involved in the decisions to begin and terminate hostilities. If a non-rational actor were assumed, the ability to predict conditions for conflict termination becomes extremely difficult if not impossible. However, as noted by Michael Handel, history has seen numerous instances where an adversary has made what his opponent felt was a non-rational conflict termination decision.¹ A Saddam Hussein, for example, might decide to continue a conflict when a decision to stop

fighting would be inevitable for a rational participant. This requirement to use a rational actor model is one of many reasons why the study of conflict termination is so difficult. Like the decision to engage in a conflict, conflict termination decisions usually involve complex political and social factors that often occur within a unique set of circumstances. Some theorists have used quantitative data to examine the conditions in which conflicts were terminated. Paul Pillar, in Negotiating Peace, categorized 142 civil and international wars fought between 1800 and 1980 based on the type of conflict ending. Two-thirds of the 111 international conflicts were terminated on the basis of negotiations, either before or after an armistice was reached.² Additionally, Pillar noted an increasing trend toward negotiated settlements occurring since 1950 when an international organization has intervened in the conflict (the United Nations intervened in eight out of nine wars).³ While studies of this nature may appear limited in value for the study of many conflict termination issues, they do point toward a focal point that may be useful to strategists of the future.

Others contributors to the field have developed conflict models to assist in identifying the typical processes in conflict termination. However, these models often provide a broad brush approach to the subject and shed little light on political and military integration strategies for conflict termination. One model that addresses strategic integration issues, by William Staudenmaier, is called The Strategic-Rational Conflict Model.

This model recognizes the limits to the rational decision process and accepts irrational factors that inevitably enter the strategist's calculations.⁴ Elements of Staudenmaier's model include; the decision to use force, the dynamics of the battlefield and conflict termination. Considerations for use of force consist of determining how the use of force is able to modify an opponent's behavior, providing a well-articulated political end to the strategist, and an analysis of risks.⁵ Six possible conflict termination mechanisms exist, according to Staudenmaier, to terminate hostilities. These six mechanisms are capitulation, armistices and cease-fires, formal peace treaties, joint political agreement, declaring unilateral victory or unilateral withdrawal.⁶ Staudenmaier observed that his conflict model shows two important trends. First, that military force has become a routine tool of diplomacy, and secondly, that it is becoming increasingly more difficult to wage war decisively (in the Clausewitzian sense).⁷ Staudenmaier concludes that:

If the goal of the political decision-maker is to resolve the political issues for which war was begun, then the emphasis of military strategy should shift from its narrow preoccupation of destroying enemy forces to a consideration of how military means may be used to resolve political issues. If I am correct in the judgment that traditional concepts of strategy are losing their validity, then this expansion of the scope of modern military strategy is of some importance.⁸

Another war termination model, developed by Bruce Clarke, seeks to explain the interrelationship between the mechanisms for ending a conflict, the nature of conflict and military strategy to

deal with specific dispute/conflict situations.⁹ Within his model, Clark identifies six stages of a conflict in which military power may be contemplated or actually employed.¹⁰ These six phases are dispute, pre-hostility, hostilities, post-hostilities, another potential dispute phase and a settlement phase. Clarke then uses Staudenmaier's six mechanisms by which conflict can end and examines them within a ten step analytical process that would lead to dispute settlement. Clarke stresses that a synchronization process is needed to reach conflict termination on favorable terms. Furthermore, he concludes that the political and economic instruments must be imposed upon the military to ensure that we achieve a clearly defined political objective.¹¹

Despite the abundance of conflict termination literature, it appears that conflict termination thought at the political-military strategic level is under-developed. Keith Dunn, in an article entitled "The Missing Link in Conflict Termination Thought: Strategy," attempts to explain why. According to Dunn, there are four areas that need attention in the formulation of U.S. strategic policy. Most of these deficiencies stem from the lack of clearly defined goals and objectives which in turn makes well-defined operational strategies for conflict termination difficult. First, Dunn states there is a lack of clarity concerning interests and objectives and that national policy declaratory statements fail to provide specific political guidance for which military strategists can develop options and alternatives.¹² General Maxwell Taylor made the following statement in 1976, but many would argue that it

is equally applicable today:

. . . busy senior officials capable of providing it (political guidance) are usually so engrossed in day-to-day tasks that they have little leisure for serious thought about the future beyond the next federal budget. Also, it is risky business for a senior politician to put on public record an estimate of future events which, if wide of the mark, would provide ammunition to his adversaries. Similarly, a president who announces specific policy goals affords the public a measure of his failure if he falls short. Hence it is common practice for officials to define foreign policy goals in the broad generalities of peace, prosperity, cooperation, and good will--unimpeachable as ideals but of little use in determining the specific objectives we are likely to pursue and the time, place, and intensity of our efforts.¹³

Secondly, the identification of levels of intensities in our national interests are lacking. Virtually no distinction is made between vital, significant, important, or areas just of interest.¹⁴ Thirdly, there is a refusal to establish priorities of these interests and objectives by region, and fourth, there is a lack of civilian involvement within the military's operational planning.¹⁵ Others have suggested that a lack of a strategic vision is aggravated by the post-Cold War environment. Roger Barnett, in "The Sinews of National Military Strategy," contends that with the demise of the Soviet Union, it is increasingly important to provide specific national security objectives to the military strategists.¹⁶ Barnett says of our current National Security Strategy: "In the final analysis, the articulated objectives leave too much to the imagination, and too much to be desired. They do not contain the specificity for the formulation of strategies about which military commanders can be confident."¹⁷

Influences On American Military Strategy. American military strategy is often the focus of intense national debate and this is not likely to end soon. Periodically, the nature of our military strategy changes in response to changing domestic political, or international situations or events. The Massive Retaliation strategy of the Eisenhower administration, the Flexible Response of the Kennedy administration, and the more recent policy of Realistic Deterrence, all reflect national military strategies attempting to carry out the policies and interests of the nation's decision-makers.

It seems inescapable that a poorly articulated national security strategy will lead to difficulties in formulating a coherent military strategy and therefore in achieving favorable conflict termination. However, I believe our military culture also plays a role in how we view conflict termination. It has not been considered within the mainstream of military thought to devote great attention to conflict termination. Many military strategists, I suspect, would prefer to spend their time discussing offensive military operations rather than conflict and post-conflict termination issues. For some, the concept of conflict or war termination conjures up the notion of firing the last round, declaring victory and departing the battlefield as triumphant warriors. Military strategists have been generally preoccupied with the requirements for near-term military operations that will lead to victory over the opponent. Moreover, it is often viewed as the domain of the diplomat in bridging the gap between military

victory and war termination political goals. Cultural and historical factors may also influence the way we think in terms of military strategy. Americans are impatient. Often our foreign policies and use of the military instrument reflects this impatience. The orientation of military strategy may change with new civilian leadership. The civilian control and decentralized leadership of the military makes military strategy formulation one of consensus building.

American values regarding war may influence how we attempt to link war and its ending. According to Morton Halperin, the American response to war is seen largely as a moral crusade in which there is little reason to restrict military might.¹⁸ Furthermore, the American image of war is one that often views war as a failure of diplomacy vice a continuation of policy. Historically, we tend to turn inward toward domestic issues in the perceived absence of a military threat. This tendency may diminish a healthy focus on military strategy during times of peace.

CHAPTER III

CONFLICT TERMINATION LESSONS

Historical examination may save us from repeating past mistakes in future conduct--if we derive the correct lessons. Past American participation in conflicts indicates that conflict and conflict termination have often been viewed as two distinct entities. Each conflict possessed a unique environment for military strategy and conflict termination issues. However, throughout our history of conflict, strategists and military planners have rarely focused on termination issues before the hostilities began. Essential to addressing the link between military strategy and conflict termination is the identification of our national interests, objectives, and strategy to terminate the conflict.

The Korean War. The Korean War witnessed many painful lessons for the United States in the complexities of conflict termination. Forty-five percent of the 33,629 American war deaths occurred during the 23 months of drawn out negotiations and more than 3,000 POWs were forced to endure the additional period of captivity and mistreatment.¹

By June 1949, the U.S. had removed its post-World War II occupation forces from South Korea. Intense debate between the military and State Department had ensued over our foreign policy in Korea, resulting in the final troop withdrawal being delayed a year

and a half after its originally scheduled date. The Joint Chiefs had concluded that there was little strategic interests in Korea and that the use of military force in Korea would be "ill-advised."² The American intervention in Korea came quite unexpectedly and surprised the senior military leaders located in Japan who were to conduct the war. Little more than five months earlier, Secretary of State Dean Acheson had delivered a speech in which he had drawn a map of the American Pacific "defense perimeter" that had the Korean peninsula clearly outside of it.³ It is generally accepted that the U.S. intervened in Korea to contain Communist aggression and to restore the status quo within South Korea. However, after General MacArthur's forces landed on the Korean peninsula and raced to the Yalu River, our political objective shifted toward one of Korean reunification. After Chinese troops entered the conflict, our political goal shifted to one of avoiding confrontation with China. Again, after peace negotiations were underway, our objectives shifted to securing an honorable cease-fire and then toward obtaining a propaganda victory over the POW repatriation issues. Throughout the fighting and lengthy negotiations, American political objectives changed several times in response to changing military and political events. Rather than achieving national policy goals through a well-conceived military strategy, we developed political objectives in an ad hoc fashion to suit the military progress of the war and negotiations.

There were several instances during the Korean War in which

there was a failure to translate strategic objectives into battlefield objectives. Among these include MacArthur's decision to advance north of the 38th parallel. MacArthur's own interpretation of the existing national strategic objectives, and subsequent advance to the Yalu River, dramatically increased the likelihood of Chinese intervention into the war. However, it does not appear that our national military objectives were so clear as to preclude misinterpretation. The instructions sent to MacArthur via the Joint Chiefs was that his objective should be "the destruction of the North Korean Armed Forces."⁴ MacArthur's orders contained a restriction on proceeding north if Soviet or Chinese Forces were encountered or had announced intended entry, but two days later he was advised by General Marshall that "we want you to feel unhampered tactically and strategically to proceed north of the 38th parallel."⁵ While it is not difficult to make an argument that MacArthur exceeded the bounds of his generalship, the following statement made by him at Senate hearings in April 1951 reflects a perceived incongruity between national policy and military strategy: "You have got to trust at that stage of the game when politics fails, and the military takes over, you must trust the military."⁶ Following the unlimited nature of World War II, participation in a war of limited objectives proved to be a difficult transition for military and civilian strategists.

Another military campaign decision that may have hindered our ability to quickly achieve national war aims was the decision to halt the U.N. offensive in June 1951. After the Chinese offensive

of May 1951 had been repulsed, U.N. forces halted at the "Kansas-Wyoming" line and awaited an enemy request for a cease-fire. There was little thought given to how this military posture might influence the war termination bargaining process. Some might argue that the risks of escalating the war by further advance north outweighed any possible benefits. Others, myself included, believe that continuing the U.N. offensive could have only enhanced our position to obtain a favorable armistice and cease-fire.⁷ Predicting the outcome of negotiations with Communist forces, had U.N. forces continued their 1951 summer offensive, is difficult. However, this instance emphasizes the importance of defining a desired end-state and possessing the ability to effectively translate it to the battlefield. Furthermore, it indicates how military strategy may become inescapably intertwined with the conflict termination process. Domestic political pressure to end the stalemate resulted in the threat to use nuclear weapons. The resulting end-state after the protracted negotiations was almost identical to what had been achieved nearly two years earlier.

The lack of a well-defined military strategy to translate national political objectives into battlefield objectives was a primary cause of our inability to favorably terminate the Korean War. However, there was a less than well-articulated national security strategy that attempted to wield the military instrument in support of its objectives. The Deputy Director of the CIA in 1974, Lieutenant General Vernon Walters, commented that if a Russian spy had broken into the Pentagon and State Department in

1950 and viewed our most sensitive plans on Korea, he would have found that the United States had no strategic interests there. General Walters went on to say that the spy couldn't break into the mind of President Truman who made the decision to go to war with Korea.⁸ While this unpredictability may work to our nation's advantage in strategic surprise and security, the lack of strategic vision imposes a tremendous burden on the military who must quickly respond to such unexpected national security decisions.⁹

The Vietnam War. Vietnam may have less definitive lessons surrounding the terminal phase of conflict, however, it exemplifies the requirement for a clearly envisioned end-state in order to effectively use the instruments of national policy. From 1949 through 1967, there were twenty-two separate official rationales for U.S. involvement in Vietnam. These rationales could be grouped into three main categories; from 1949 to 1962, they centered around resisting Communist aggression; from 1962 to 1968, they emphasized U.S. counterinsurgency efforts; and from 1968 on, the emphasis was on preserving the integrity of American commitments.¹⁰ Perhaps the North Vietnamese had learned from U.S. participation in Korea. Rather than precipitating a massive U.S. military response by a conventional attack, the North Vietnamese opened their campaign against South Vietnam with guerrilla warfare. Politically unwilling to attack the source of the war in North Vietnam, the U.S. strategic response became one of counterinsurgency in South Vietnam.¹¹

Harry Summers, in On Strategy, assessed the U.S. military strategy in Vietnam as "a failure in strategic military doctrine--manifested on the battlefield. Because it did not focus on the political aim to be achieved--containment of North Vietnamese expansion--our so called strategy was never a strategy at all. At best it could be called a kind of grand tactics."¹² One of the most frustrating aspects of this war for the military in Vietnam was that it accomplished its tactical goals and yet was seemingly unable to "win" the war.¹³ Summers believes there was a failure by military professionals to judge the true nature of the war in Vietnam. Furthermore, this failure resulted in confusion throughout the national security establishment over tactics and strategy that exists to this day.¹⁴ He concludes that "[p]rior to any further commitment of U.S. military forces, our military leaders must insist that the civilian leadership provide tangible, obtainable political goals" and that "the political objective cannot be merely a platitude, but must be stated in concrete terms."¹⁵

The Persian Gulf War. In contrast to U.S. involvement in Korea and Vietnam, U.S. national interests in the Persian Gulf had been previously well-articulated by our strategic decision-makers. President Carter in 1980, in what was termed the "Carter Doctrine," had identified the Gulf region as an area of vital interest when he said: "An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf Region will be regarded as an assault on the vital

interests of the United States of America. Such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force."¹⁶ Throughout the 1980's the United States had maintained a strategic focus on the region. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in August of 1990, national security policy statements provided a relatively clear picture of the desired end-state in Kuwait. President Bush said of the Iraqi attack on Kuwait in a speech to the nation on August 8, 1990: "The acquisition of territory by force is unacceptable. . . . First, we seek the immediate, unconditional, and complete withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Second, Kuwait's legitimate government must be restored to replace the puppet regime."¹⁷ From this and other statements made by our strategic decision-makers, the theater CINC was able to define end-states based on clearly enunciated policy goals from the White House. In fact the principle national strategic objective, the removal of the Iraqis from Kuwait, became the theater commander's strategic objective in Operation Desert Storm.¹⁸ The Bush administration continued to build regional and worldwide support for its intended action and achieved concurrent economic and diplomatic support through contributions of funding or military forces from a large coalition of partners.

The ensuing military campaign, Operation Desert Storm, saw the use of overwhelming air and ground forces that quickly achieved our nation's political objective of the removal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. In the end, Iraq was left with little ability to dictate the conditions for a cease-fire or negotiations as coalition forces

were poised to inflict further damage. However, as the nation's second objective involved the liberation and restoration of a government, additional challenges were imposed upon the strategic planners of Desert Storm. Since the military occupation of Europe and Japan in post-World War II, the U.S. Army has developed reserve based Civil Affairs (CA) units that conduct a wide array of civil-military operations (CMO) for conflicts involving occupation or liberation.¹⁹ Activated by the Presidential Reserve call up in Desert Storm, these CA units attempted to integrate CMO activities in order to accomplish the restoration of the Kuwaiti government.

John Fishel, in Liberation, Occupation, and Rescue: War Termination and Desert Storm, identified the difficulties of integrating CMO activities with war fighting plans and operations and the requirement for synchronized war aims in order to be effective. There were instances during the war with Iraq where military and civil-military end-state objectives were at odds with each other.²⁰ Additionally, Fishel points out that the U.S. Government had a political objective for Kuwait that was not adequately reflected in the end-state identified by the military planners; the movement of the Kuwaiti government to a more democratic mode upon its restoration.²¹

The implications of national policy rhetoric on the conflict termination operations is described by Fishel's discussion of Operation Provide Comfort.²² When President Bush called for the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, it gave the Kurds of Northern Iraq the impetus for rebellion. However, Iraqi forces conducted offensive

operations against the Kurds which resulted in mass migrations into Turkey. Subsequently, a massive humanitarian relief mission, in Provide Comfort, was initiated which required significant U.S. military involvement. Fishel concludes that the Persian Gulf war demonstrated that:

War termination . . . is a phase of military operations that must be planned in full coordination with war fighting. To be successful, its objectives need to be defined in end-state terms with clear supporting objectives that are both military and civil-military in nature. This, in turn, suggests that civil-military operations in the post-conflict period--post-conflict activities--may be a necessary condition for victory. Thus, when the political-military and the exclusively military end-states are not fully synchronized,²³ then strategic victory is that much harder to achieve.

Some voices remain critical that Saddam Hussein was left in power and that the United States failed to destroy all of Iraq's military capability. The United States' political aims, achieved through the combined use of instruments of national power, contained neither of these goals. The resulting humanitarian effort in Provide Comfort and complex array of civil-military requirements in Desert Storm, do however, indicate that future conflicts may well require fully integrated conflict termination planning, execution and post-hostility strategies.

CHAPTER IV

MILITARY DOCTRINE & CONFLICT TERMINATION

Military doctrine defines the way the armed forces will think about accomplishing its mission. Doctrine is normally shaped by a variety of mechanisms including; technological advances, strategic development, inter-service relationships, roles and missions, history, and the threats facing a nation. U.S. military doctrine has undergone significant and needed changes since the Vietnam era and is still being shaped by the post-Cold War environment.¹

Current Joint and U.S. Army doctrine discusses strategic planning as a means to arrive at an envisioned end-state in conflict. Each addresses three levels of war as a doctrinal perspective to frame the broad range of activities the combatant commander employs to achieve national objectives. These three levels of war are the strategic, operational and tactical. The operational level of war is a relatively recent addition to U.S. warfighting doctrine.² As defined in Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5:

At the operational level of war, joint and combined operational forces within a theater of operations perform subordinate campaigns and major operations and plan, conduct, and sustain to accomplish the strategic objectives of the unified commander or higher military authority. The operational level is the vital link between national- and theater-strategic aims and the tactical employment of forces on the battlefield.³

The term operational art is used to describe the employment of forces within the operational level of war. Operational art translates theater strategy into an operational design which links

and integrates the tactical battles and engagements that, when fought and won, achieves the strategic aim.⁴ Stated another way, the effective use of operational art focuses the fighting forces on arriving at an end-state that achieves our national objectives in times of conflict. Both Army and Joint Doctrine poses a series of questions for the military commander that, when answered, will enable the military campaign planner to achieve strategic objectives in a theater of operations. These questions include:

- What military conditions will achieve the strategic objective in the theater of war or theater of operations?
- What sequence of actions is most likely to produce these conditions?
- How should the commander apply military resources within established limitations to accomplish that sequence of actions?
- What is the likely cost or risk to the joint force in performing that sequence of actions?⁵

As demonstrated in Desert Storm, the U.S. military forces effectively employed its doctrinal guidance and quickly achieved the military defeat of the Iraqi Army. Military doctrine has unquestionably improved our ability to link strategic objectives and tactical engagements. However, it still leaves much to the discretion of the theater commander with regards to the complexities of terminating hostilities and post-conflict activities.

Conflict Termination Doctrine. The 1993 revision of Army FM 100-5 includes basic discussions on war and conflict termination, as well as a few words on post-conflict considerations.⁶ However,

these subjects are not integrated into the manual's discussion of campaign planning considerations. An issue that complicates the utilization of doctrine to address conflict and war termination is the use of the terms within military doctrine. The U.S. Army classifies its activities in peacetime and conflict as operations other than war. Whereas the environment of war is considered to involve the use of force in combat operations against an armed enemy.⁷ The term conflict, however, is characterized by hostilities to secure strategic objectives.⁸ The term conflict termination is defined as the process and period during which military forces transition from active combat operations to postconflict activities and from postconflict activities to redeployment.⁹ The doctrinal distinctions between war and conflict, hostilities and combat, are often blurred. Since the United States has not technically been at war in any conflict since World War II, the difference almost loses its relevance. However, the subtle differences in the definitions contribute to a perception that conflict termination is not an integral part of how we think and plan for war or conflict. Joint doctrine for campaign planning also lacks detailed conflict termination planning guidance and has yet to formalize its definitions of conflict and termination objectives.¹⁰ Despite a cursory discussion of conflict termination issues in U.S. military doctrine, myself and others feel that further doctrinal guidance is required to address the complex issues in the types of conflicts that warfighters are likely to face in the future.¹¹

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions. History has demonstrated the necessity of well-articulated political and militarily achievable national goals as a prerequisite to terminating conflicts on favorable terms. While success on the battlefield is a necessary condition, it alone does not guarantee reaching the desired end-state. We are unlikely to see in the near term, a detailed national security strategy that will enable military strategists to construct an explicit national military strategy. The lack of clearly defined vital interests, regional priorities, and interagency integration in strategic planning is likely to continue. The price for this shortcoming has been reflected in the conduct, and some would say outcome, of past military conflicts. However, armed with this knowledge and recognition, senior military leaders must insist that the military instrument of national policy undertake only objectives that are capable of translating national interests on the battlefield. Operation Desert Storm graphically demonstrated the military's ability to link national strategy and the tactical engagement given appropriate objectives. Simultaneously, this conflict demonstrated the complex issues in conflict termination that we are likely to face in the years ahead.

Conflict termination strategies links conflict resolution with the desired peace and they cannot be viewed separately. Conflict termination is a phase of military operations that must be

coordinated in the operational plans for war. While military strategists have begun to consider the requirement for conflict termination strategies, it remains under-developed in our military culture and doctrine.

Recommendations. Conflict termination considerations require greater emphasis within U.S. military doctrine. Rather than being viewed as a phase between hostilities and non-hostilities, military and civilian strategists require conflict termination doctrinal guidance in pre-hostility campaign planning. Detailed conflict termination planning considerations must be integrated into both service and joint campaign planning doctrine to be effective. The myriad of conflict termination issues require that they be fully synchronized with battlefield plans. Used as a planning tool, this guidance will make conflict termination strategies an inseparable part of the equation for victory. As an often quoted, but neglected, paraphrase of Clausewitz states; we should not take the first step without considering the last.¹

NOTES

Chapter I

1. Fred C. Ikle, Every War Must End (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), p. 108.
2. B.H. Liddel Hart, Strategy 2nd revised edition (New York: Praeger, 1967), p. xvii.
3. Ibid., p. 353.
4. Michael I. Handel, War, Strategy and Intelligence (London: Frank Cass and Company, Limited, 1989), p. 456.
5. Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 3-0, Doctrine For Joint Operations (Washington: 1993), p. GL-11.
6. Ibid., p. GL-12.

Chapter II

1. Handel, pp. 460-466.
2. Paul R. Pillar, Negotiating Peace (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), pp. 13-43.
3. Ibid., p. 26.
4. William O. Staudenmaier, "Conflict Termination in the Nuclear Era," Stephen J. Cimbala and Keith A. Dunn, ed., Conflict Termination and Military Strategy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), pp. 18-19.
5. Ibid., pp. 22-30.
6. Ibid., pp. 28-29.
7. Ibid., p. 30.
8. Ibid.
9. Bruce B. G. Clarke, "Conflict Termination: A Rational Model," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol 16, Jan-Mar 1993, pp. 25-50.
10. Ibid., pp. 28-30.
11. Ibid., pp. 46-47.

12. Keith A. Dunn, "The Missing Link in Conflict Termination Thought: Strategy," Stephen J. Cimbala, ed., Conflict Termination and Military Strategy: Coercion, Persuasion, and War (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), pp. 175-181.

13. Maxwell D. Taylor, quoted in Dunn, pp. 178-179.

14. Dunn, pp. 181-183.

15. Ibid., pp. 183-187.

16. Roger W. Barnett, "The Sinews of National Security Strategy," United States Strategic Institute, January 1994, pp. 8-9.

17. Ibid., p. 9.

18. Morton H. Halperin, Limited War in the Nuclear Age (New York: Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1963), p. 19.

CHAPTER III

1. Bernard Brodie, War and Politics, (New York: Macmillan Company, 1973), p. 106.

2. Kim C. Baum and James I. Matray, ed., Korea and the Cold War: Division, Destruction, and Disarmament (Claremont: Regina Books, 1993), p. 90. ;

3. Brodie, p. 59.

4. Ibid., p. 71.

5. Ibid., p. 72.

6. General Douglas MacArthur, quoted in Pillar, p. 33.

7. Brodie, pp. 91-95. Brodie argued that with the Communist forces were ripe for destruction, U.N. forces should have continued their military advance toward the narrow waist of the Korean peninsula. He concludes that by deciding to halt the offensive, we decided inadvertently on a continuance of the war.

8. Lieutenant General Vernon Walters, quoted in Harry G. Summers, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (Novato: Presidio Press, 1982), p. 192.

9. Summers, pp. 192-193.

10. Ibid., p. 98.

11. Ibid., p. 88.

12. Ibid., p. 89.
13. Ibid., p. 1.
14. Ibid., p. 91.
15. Ibid., p. 185.
16. President Carter, quoted in Arthur F. Lykke, "Defining Military Strategy," Military Review, May 1989, pp. 6-7.
17. President Bush, quoted in John T. Fishel, Liberation, Occupation, and Rescue: War Termination and Desert Storm (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1992), p. 12.
18. Fishel, p. 60.
19. Ibid., p. 2.
20. This assertion is based on the targeting of the Iraqi electrical grid system. CENTCOM targeters desired a destruction method that would disable Iraqi electrical power for the longest duration. CMO planners desired the electrical grid system be disabled so as to enable repair in a short period in order to prevent hardship among the Iraqi population. See Fishel, p. 32.
21. Ibid., p. 61.
22. Ibid., chapter 6.
23. Ibid., p. 69.

CHAPTER IV

1. See Brodie, Chapter 9, for a discussion of Vietnam era U.S. Army doctrine.
2. The "operational level of war" was introduced into Army Doctrine in the 1982 revision of Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations. See John F. Meehan, "The Operational Trilogy," Parameters, Autumn 1986, p. 9.
3. U.S. Department of the Army, Operations, Field Manual 100-5 (Washington: June 1993), p. 6-2.
4. Ibid.
5. The first three questions are contained in Army FM 100-5 Operations, and all four questions are posed in Joint Publications. See FM 100-5, p. 6-2, and Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine For Joint Operations, p. II-4.

6. FM 100-5 Operations, pp. 3-7, 3-11, 3-12, 6-23.

7. Ibid., p. 2-0.

8. Ibid., p. 2-0. However, FM 100-5 defines "conflict" in its glossary as "the period characterized by confrontation and the need to engage in hostilities other than to secure strategic objectives," p. G1-2. As this contradicts p. 2-0, it is assumed the glossary definition is in error.

9. Ibid.

10. JCS Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms of Dec 89 does not define conflict or conflict termination. However, the initial draft of JCS Pub 5-00.1, Doctrine for Joint Campaign Planning, June 92, has proposed definitions for "conflict" and "termination objectives" that once approved will be placed in JCS Pub 1-02. However, JCS Pub 5-00.1 does not address conflict termination issues in campaign planning considerations.

11. See James W. Reed, "Should Deterrence Fail: War Termination in Campaign Planning," Parameters, Summer 1993, and John T. Fishel, Liberation, Occupation, and Rescue: War Termination and Desert Storm, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, August 1992.

CHAPTER V

1. Clausewitz, p. 584.

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